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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. . : '-
COREY B. MAISEY, : Case No. 20030218-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for disarming a peace officer, a first degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.8 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002) (pour-over provision). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Has defendant established (a) that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
challenging defendant's seizure or (b) that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte 
declaring the seizure illegal?1 
This issue, raised for the first time on appeal, must be determined as a matter of law 
on the existing record. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92. Defendant 
1
 The State's Point I responds to Defendant's Point I (ineffective counsel), Point II 
(plain error), and Point III (fruit of the poisonous tree). 
bears the burden of establishing that his counsel performed deficiently or that the trial court 
obviously erred. See id. at*flj 8,19 & 31. Defendant also must demonstrate that, but for the 
deficiency or error, there exists a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have 
been different. See id. ffl[ 19, 31 & n.14. 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of defendant's fugitive status to 
establish his motive in fleeing and forcibly confronting the police? 
The decision to admit evidence is reviewed only for abuse of discretion; however, 
when the evidence consists of prior bad acts of the defendant, the trial court must 
"scrupulously examine" its relevancy, probative value, and potential prejudice before 
admitting it. See State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, f 24, 61 P.3d 291 (explaining the 
interplay of rules 402, 403, and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Defendant was convicted of violating section 76-5-102.8, which reads: 
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally takes or removes, 
or attempts to take or remove, a firearm from the person or immediate presence 
of a person he knows is a peace officer: 
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and 
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer. 
Additionally, the following determinative provisions are included in Addendum A: 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; 
UTAHR. EVID. 402; 
UTAHR. EVID. 403; 
UTAH R. EVID. 404. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 18, 2000, defendant was charged with intentionally disarming 
Detective Nathan Jensen, an Ogden police officer and member of the Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force (R. 1; R146: 135-36). 
Prior to trial, defense counsel actively engaged in discovery and investigation (R. 12-
13, 23, 26, 51-52, 69-70). Nevertheless, defendant complained that his counsel was not 
conducting discovery and was not filing requested motions (R. 45-46).2 The court questioned 
defendant and counsel (R148: 2-19). Counsel explained that while he and defendant argued, 
they maintained a working relationship in which counsel actively pursued discovery and 
strategically considered the merits of defendant's various requests (id.). The court found 
their disagreement resulted from counsel's "candid" expression to defendant of the strength 
of the State's case (R148: 4-5). The court found no basis to conclude that counsel's 
performance was deficient and denied defendant's request for the appointment of conflicts 
counsel (R. 73). 
On April 9, 2001, a two-day jury trial commenced (R. 77-78). Defendant did not 
testify, but called five witnesses, including a medical/drug expert, to substantiate his claim 
that he did not know Detective Jensen was a police officer and/or did not intentionally disarm 
him (id.). The jury was instructed on the charged offense of disarming a peace officer and, 
consistent with the defense theories, was also instructed on the lesser included offenses of 
assault on a peace officer, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.4 (1999), and simple assault, UTAH 
2
 The complaints are not those raised on appeal (R. 45-46; R148: 2-19). 
3 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (1999) (R 100-02). The jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 
131). The court sentenced defendant to imprisonment for five-years-to-life, consecutive to 
a one-to-fifteen-year sentence defendant was already serving (R 78; R147: 149). 
On April 20, 2001, defendant filed a pro se motion for new trial, which was denied 
on April 19, 2001 (R. 82-84).3 Two years later, defendant filed a post-conviction petition 
based, in part, on the failure to appeal his conviction (R. 134). On February 24, 2003, the 
court re-sentenced defendant nunc pro tunc to enable him to appeal. See Second Dist. Ct. 
Docket No. 001903816FS. On March 13, 2003, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal 
from the 2001 judgment and conviction. See Utah Court of Appeals Docket No. 20030218-
CA and R. 144 (amended notice). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS4 
What should have been a routine "knock and talk" had turned deadly. Defendant had 
both his hands on Detective Nathan Jensen's service revolver as the two struggled back and 
forth (R146: 158). The detective thought, "I [am] going to die" (id.). 
"He's running, help." 
On August 25,2000, Agent Chad Barnett, Agent Troy Burnett, and Detective Jensen, 
members of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force, went a South Ogden condominium 
3
 The motion raised grounds different than those raised on appeal (R. 82-84). 
4
 Defendant concedes the evidence supports his conviction. See Brief of Appellant 
[Br.Aplt.J at 9. Because the issues raised are fact-dependent, however, the facts are set 
out in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2. 
4 
to investigate a complaint that marijuana was being used and sold on the premises (R146: 53-
54, 58-59, 136, 141). Their intent was to conduct a "knock and talk" (R146: 57-58, 104).5 
The officers walked through an open gate into a large fenced patio area (R146:60-61). 
Kyle Bass was seated on the steps leading to the condominium's front door (id.). Because 
the officers were in plain clothes, Agent Burnett explained they were with the Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force and identified the officers by name (R146: 63,106,108,144). Agents 
Burnett and Jensen displayed their badges (R146: 63, 104-05, 139, 145; R147: 26, 32, 67). 
Kyle said he did not live there (R146: 108). 
The officers knocked on the front door (id.). Danny Winder, the owner/occupant, 
responded (R146: 64, 108; R147: 72). Jason Maisey, defendant's brother, and Jason's 
girlfriend, Amanda, came out (R146: 64,108). The officers again introduced themselves as 
police officers and displayed their badges (R146: 108; R147: 27). 
The officers explained why they were there and asked permission to frisk the four 
(R146: 106-07). They agreed (R146: 145, 148; R147: 27, 87). Drugs were found on Kyle 
and Danny (R146: 64, 145). While still outside, Agent Barnett heard someone descending 
the stairs inside the condominium and asked who was inside (R146: 64,145-46). Jason said 
his brother Corey (defendant) (R146: 64, 147; R147: 87). The officers and Jason called 
defendant by name, but he did not respond (R146: 65, 109). 
5
 A "knock and talk" is a consensual encounter where the police go to the suspect's 
residence, knock on the door, identify themselves as police officers, explain the complaint 
received, and "go from there" based on willingness of the owner/occupant to speak with 
them and/or permit a search of his person or premises (R146: 57-58, 106-07). 
5 
Agent Chad Barnett asked Danny if they could go inside to get defendant (R146: 65-
67, 147). Danny hesitated and asked if he could go in alone (R146: 66). Agent Troy Burnett 
explained that for security reasons, they could not agreed to that (id.). Agent Burnett further 
explained that if Danny did not consent, the police would need a search warrant to enter (id.). 
Danny then consented to the police accompanying him into the residence (R146:65,67,109, 
147-48; R147: 28). 
Danny went in first, followed by Agent Barnett, who displayed his badge on the 
outside of his shirt (R146: 63, 67, 71, 148; R147: 67). Danny lead the officer downstairs 
(R146: 67, 109). Danny said he could not see defendant, but the agent asked him to walk 
farther into the basement (R146: 68). As they passed a bathroom, Agent Barnett saw 
defendant's reflection in the mirror: he was crouched down, hiding behind the bathroom door 
(R146: 69-70). Agent Barnett announced, "Police, come out" (R146: 70, 84-85, 90). 
Without verbally responding, defendant "bolted" out of the bathroom (R146: 72, 90; R147: 
76). He pushed Danny aside and "charged up" the stairs "like an offensive running back in 
football" (R146: 72; R147: 18-19). Barnett yelled, "He's running, help" (R146: 72-73). 
"I'm the police, chill out." 
When Agent Barnett went downstairs, Agent Burnett remained at the top of the stairs 
for security (R146: 109). Burnett's badge and service revolver were exposed on his belt 
(R146: 104, 112, 127). As defendant bolted up the stairs and saw Burnett, he did not pause 
(R146: 112). Instead, he attempted to push pass Burnett or push him on "his butt" by 
"lunging" at him and hitting him in the chest (R146: 112, 128-29). Burnett felt defendant 
• ' • " • 6 . 
had assaulted him and hit him back (R146: 128; R147: 95). Swinging at each other, they fell 
out the front door and off the steps onto the patio where they wrestled on the ground (R146: 
112-13). Burnett yelled at defendant, "I'm the police, chill out" (R146: 113, 132-33). 
Defendant continued to fight (R146: 113). 
"He's getting my gun." 
Detective Jensen was on the patio with Kyle, Jason, and Amanda (R146: 148). 
Everything was "very calm" until Jensen heard Barnett's call for help, heard a bang "like 
something falling down," and then saw defendant and Burnett struggling on the ground 
(R146: 148-49). He heard Burnett tell defendant that he was a police officer and to "chill 
out"(R146: 152). 
When Jensen ran to assist Burnett, defendant looked directly at him (R146: 151). 
Jensen had his badge in his hand (R146: 149-50). He extended his arm, placing the badge 
in front of defendant, and yelled, "We're the police, we're the police" (R146: 151-52). 
Defendant "flailed" at him and hit the badge out of his hand (R146: 152). 
Jensen pulled out his service revolver, holding it tight into his body to minimize the 
possibility that defendant could grab or dislodge the weapon (R146: 149, 151-52). 
Nevertheless, as Jensen tried to hand-cuff him, defendant slipped out of Burnett's grip and 
grabbed Jensen's gun with both his hands (R146: 153-55). Jensen pulled back on the gun 
with "all his might," but could not release defendant's grip (R146: 156-57). Instead, as 
Jensen pulled, defendant just "came with" him (R146:156). Jensen threw his free arm around 
defendant's neck in a bear-hold (R146: 157). They struggled back and forth until the gun 
7 
was the only thing connecting them, but defendant still would not release his two-handed grip 
(R146: 156-57). Jensen shouted, "he's getting my gun" (R146: 116). 
"I could shoot him or I could kick him." 
Burnett only realized that Jensen had joined the fray when Burnett suddenly found 
himself on the ground without defendant (R146:l 15). Burnett saw defendant's hands on 
Jensen's gun and realized that defendant was trying to disarm him (id.). 
Burnett was worried: children were playing on the other side of the patio fence and 
Kyle and the others were standing only feet away (R146: 132, 144). Burnett figured he had 
"two choices. Because [defendant's] grabbing the gun, that's deadly force. If he gets that 
gun away, everybody out there is in danger. Everybody. Me, everybody. I could shoot him 
or I could kick him. I chose to kick him, knock him out" (R146:125-26, 132). 
Burnett stood on the front steps, slightly above defendant and Jensen, and kicked 
defendant as hard as he could in the face (R146: 116). Defendant did not react (id.). Burnett 
could not understand how defendant was still standing after the blow, much less still fighting, 
and wondered why defendant did not simply run since the front gate was open and unblocked 
(R146: 133). Jensen similarly wondered why defendant did not try to "bowl" him over and 
"get out of Dodge" (R146: 158). The two officers came to same conclusion: defendant 
wanted Jensen's gun (R146: 116-17, 124, 131). 
The gun was slipping out of Jensen's hand (Rl 46: 156-59). He believed if defendant 
got it, Jensen "was going to die" (R146: 158). Jensen made a "last ditch effort... to take 
[defendant] to the ground" (Rl 46:158-59). When that failed, Jensen pulled the gun's trigger, 
8 
hoping to hit defendant mid-body (R146: 159). Instead, the bullet hit defendant's hand (id.). 
Defendant did not stop fighting (R146: 118-19, 123-24, 131, 159, 165). 
Agent Barnett ran to help Jensen (R146: 74-75). Barnett pulled defendant's legs out 
from under him (R146: 75, 122). The two officers fell or sat on defendant, who continued 
to struggle on the ground (R146: 75-76,118-20). Jensen wrapped a shirt around defendant's 
bleeding hand (Rl 46:159-60). As defendant lay bleeding, he screamed, "those pigs just shot 
me" (R146: 120, 225; R147: 29, 92, 104). 
Defendant later confessed that he knew the officers were "cops," but denied grabbing 
Jensen's gun (R147: 18-20). At trial, the defense argued that defendant was under the 
influence of methamphetamine and mistakenly thought the officers were gang members 
(R147: 122-37). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fourth Amendment Claim Raised Under Ineffective Counsel and Plain Error: 
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the legality of 
his seizure, which defendant characterizes as occurring when Agent Barnett ordered him out 
of hiding. He also claims that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte declaring the 
seizure illegal. Defendant argues that if the Fourth Amendment issue had been addressed 
below, it would have resulted in the suppression of the evidence which flowed from the 
seizure, i.e., his ensuing confrontation with the officers. Utah precedent summarily disposes 
of defendant's claim. 
9 
In Utah, a person has no right to physically resist a police order, irrespective of the 
legality of the order. Consequently, the lawfulness of Agent Barnett's directive has no 
impact on the outcome of this case: whether lawful or not, defendant had no right to resist 
the order by assaulting the officers and disarming Detective Jensen. Additionally, Utah law 
recognizes that a prior police illegality becomes irrelevant if the suspect, as defendant did 
here, commits an intervening illegal act, in this case, assault on Agent Burnett and disarming 
Detective Jensen. 
A motion to suppress would have been futile and, therefore, counsel was not 
ineffective and the court did not plainly err in not addressing the Fourth Amendment issue. 
A dmission of Defendant's Fugitive Status to Establish Motive: Defendant similarly 
ignores established law in arguing that evidence of his fugitive status was irrelevant to the 
charged offense. Universally, courts recognize that when a defendant forcibly resists or 
confronts a police order, the defendant's fugitive status is highly relevant to his motive and 
intent. Consequently, such evidence is commonly admitted. 
In this case, the trial court scrutinized the evidence of defendant's fugitive status by 
considered its relevancy and weighing its probative value and prejudicial impact. Pursuant 
to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the court then correctly exercised its discretion and 
admitted the bad acts evidence to establish defendant's motive in fleeing and forcibly 




THE LEGALITY OF THE UNDERLYING POLICE ORDER HAS NO 
RELEVANCE TO THE OFFENSE OF DISARMING A PEACE 
OFFICER; CONSEQUENTLY, TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT 
INEFFECTIVE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR 
IN FAILING TO ADDRESS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE 
Defendant claims that he was unlawfully seized when Officer Barnett ordered him to 
"come out" of the bathroom {Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 20-21). Defendant failed to 
preserve this claim below and, therefore, the issue is waived unless he now establishes that 
he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel or that the trial 
court plainly erred. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 9, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, Tf 11, 10 P.3d 346. To that end, defendant claims that his trial counsel was 
deficient in failing to challenge his seizure and the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte 
declaring the seizure illegal {Br.Aplt. at 14 & 20). Defendant further argues that if the Fourth 
Amendment issue had been raised below, his subsequent acts of fleeing, assaulting, and 
disarming the officers would have been suppressed and the evidence of his parole fugitive 
status would have been inadmissible {Br.Aplt. at 16 & 25). But for the failure to address the 
Fourth Amendment issue, defendant claims he would not have been convicted {Br.Aplt. at 
16 & 23-24). 
Defendant's argument, however, ignores controlling precedent. Utah law firmly 
recognizes that a person may not forcibly resist a police order, irrespective of its legality. 
6
 Point I responds to defendant's Points I, II, & III. 
11 
Consequently, whether the directive to "come out" was lawful or not, defendant had no right 
to react to it with force. See American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131,1ft 13-16, 
63 P.3d 675 (holding that the lawfulness of an attempted arrest or detention does not divest 
a police officer of his authority and, therefore, is "irrelevant" to a conviction for interfering 
with a peace officer); State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 33, 57 P.3d 1052 (reaffirming that "in 
Utah there is no right to physically resist either an arrest or an order of the police, irrespective 
of the legality or the arrest or order, so long as the officers are within the scope of their 
authority"); State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574-76 (Utah 1991) (rejecting common law 
rule and holding that in Utah, the prosecution need not establish the lawfulness of the order 
which precipitated an assault on a police officer who "is doing what he or she was employed 
to do"). Moreover, a prior illegality is inconsequential, if in response, defendant commits 
a new intervening crime. See State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah App. 1997 
(holding that "[a]n illegal entry or prior illegality by officers does not affect the subsequent 
arrest of a defendant where there is an intervening illegal act by the suspect"and, therefore, 
is ); State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App.) (holding that a prior undisputed 
illegal seizure was "inconsequential" once the defendant tampered with the evidence and, 
thereby, committed a new crime), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (1993). 
In sum, because determination of the Fourth Amendment issue would not affect the 
outcome of defendant's conviction, he suffered no prejudice from the failure to consider it. 
12 
(A) Analytical Framework of a Fourth Amendment Claim in the Context of 
the Sixth Amendment and Plain Error. 
To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must show that his or her "counsel's performance was deficient, in that 
it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment[,]" and that the 
deficiency was prejudicial, in that it "affected the outcome of the case." See Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, f 19. Likewise, to establish that the trial court plainly erred, a defendant must show 
that "an error occurred that should have been obvious to the trial court and that prejudiced 
the outcome of his trial." Id. atf 31. 
While the requirements of deficient performance and obvious error are distinct, in 
application, they are similar-for in both cases, the underlying claim must have merit. See 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ] 34, 989 P.2d 52; State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, f 22, 
55 P.3d 1147; State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 41, 55 P.3d 1131 (all recognizing that 
counsel has no constitutional duty to raise non-meritorious motions), cert, denied, 63 P.3d 
104 (Utah 2003); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) (requiring that a trial 
court actually err for plain error). In addition, the prejudice prongs of both standards are 
identical. Litherland, 2002 UT 76, ^ fl| 19,31 &n.l4. Thus, to prevail under either analysis, 
defendant must establish that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and would have 
resulted in the exclusion of evidence necessary to support his conviction. See Kimmelman 
v. Morrison, Ml U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (addressing Fourth Amendment argument raised in 
context of Sixth Amendment claim). Accord Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 & 1225 (defining 
13 
prejudice under both analyses as a "reasonable probability" that absent the error, the outcome 
of the trial would have been "more favorable"). 
Here, defendant fails to meet these requirements. 
(B) Defendant Has Not Established that an Illegality Occurred, 
The State maintains that Agent Barnett's directive to defendant to "come out" from 
hiding was lawful, but even if it were unlawful, defendant had no right to forcibly resist it. 
See Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131,H[13-16; Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 33; Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 
574-76. Additionally, even if the directive were unlawful, defendant's commission of a new 
intervening crime dissipated any taint. See Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008; Wagstaff, 846 P.2d 
at 1313. Consequently, because lack of prejudice disposes of the Fourth Amendment issues, 
its merits need not be determined. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31 n.14 (recognizing 
"analytical shortcut" whereby lack of prejudice disposes of both ineffective counsel and plain 
error claims). Nevertheless, the State summarily addresses defendant's argument to correct 
its factual and legal errors. 
Defendant asserts that his counsel conducted no discovery and did not recognize that 
a Fourth Amendment issue existed (Br.Aplt. at 13 & 15), These allegations have no record 
support. Instead, the existing record demonstrates that trial counsel actively engaged in 
pretrial preparation and that when that preparation was questioned, albeit on other grounds, 
the trial court found no deficiency in counsel's pretrial preparation (R. 12-13,23,26, 51-52, i 
69-70, 73; R148: 2-19). The record also establishes that counsel was clearly prepared for 
trial and presented an active and focused defense (R146: 17,26-39,48-53, 78-88,92-93,95-
• • . -• 1 4 ; • 
102,122-31,161-65,173-75,201-03,210-18,226-31;R147: 1-11,20-30,36-37,40-53,63-
75, 79-91, 122-37). See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 17 (presuming "that any argument of 
ineffectiveness presented [on appeal] is supported by all the relevant evidence of which 
defendant is aware," and, therefore, any ambiguities or deficiencies in the record "will be 
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively"). See also Yarborough 
v. Gentry, 2003 WL 22382563 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2003) (recognizing that the presumption that 
counsel exercised professional judgment applies with even greater force when the appellant 
"bases his ineffective-assistance claim solely on the trial record"). Compare Kimmelman, 
All U.S. at 368-69 & 385 (finding trial counsel deficient for failing to challenge a search 
only after an evidentiary hearing established that counsel failed to conduct any discovery and 
admitted he was unaware a search occurred until one day before trial). 
Defendant next contends that Danny, the owner/occupant, did not consent to the 
police entry into his home (Br.Aplt. at 22). Again, this claim is not supported by the record. 
Agents Barnett, Burnett, and Jensen testified that Danny consented to the police entry and 
led Barnett downstairs. See Statement of Facts, supra. While Danny initially offered to go 
in alone and momentarily hesitated when first asked for consent, he did not claim that his 
consent was not voluntary (R146: 65-67, 109, 147-48; R147: 28, 67, 76).7 Nor is there any 
record support for defendant's claim that Danny was "threatened" with a search warrant 
(Br.Aplt. at 22); he was simply told that if he did not consent, the police needed a warrant to 
enter the residence (R146: 66). 
7
 Danny was a defense witness at trial (R147: 65). 
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Defendant argues that even if Danny's consent were valid, "once the Defendant is 
seen and asked to come out, his refusal countermands any possible permission received from 
Danny" (Br.Aplt. at 22). Again, defendant's argument lacks support. When Agent Barnett 
saw defendant's reflection in the mirror and asked him to "come out," defendant did not 
refuse; to the contrary, he "bolted" from the bathroom, pushed Danny aside, and ran full 
speed up the stairs. See Statement of Facts, supra. The State is aware of no authority—and 
defendant cites none—for the proposition that a suspect's flight withdraws a third-party's 
consent to search. 
Nor is there legal support for defendant's assertion that hiding from the police in the 
common areas of another person's home creates a legitimate expectation of privacy when the 
owner/occupant consents to the search {Br.Aplt. at 22). Compare State v. Bissegger, 2003 
UT App 256, ffl[ 6-7 & 12, 76 P.3d 178 (recognizing constitutional privacy interest in a 
passenger's opaque lip-balm container because the passenger's expectation of privacy in the 
closed personal item was subjectively and objectively reasonable). Nor is there any record 
support for defendant's suggestion that he had the authority to override Danny's consent. 
Defendant also claims that when Officer Barnett directed defendant to "come out"of 
hiding, the otherwise consensual search escalated to an arrest requiring probable cause or, 
at minimum, to a level-two detention requiring reasonable suspicion (Br.Aplt. at 20). Again, 
defendant's argument lacks merit. A directive to come out of hiding does not constitute a 
"seizure" when the defendant flees. See State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 
1990) (recognizing that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurs if a person disregards the 
16 
police order), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). Accord Scott v. Maryland, 782 A.2d 
862, 869 (Md. App. 2001) (holding that no seizure occurs during "knock and talk" until the 
police by physical force or show of authority restrain an occupant's liberty), cert, denied, 535 
U.S. 940 (2002). 
Here, no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred until defendant reached the top of the 
stairs, defendant assaulted Agent Burnett, and the agent fought back (R146: 111-12,128-29; 
R147: 31-32, 73, 76). See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing 
that a Forth Amendment detention occurs "when the officer by means of physical force or 
show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a person") (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Consequently, even if the police had no authority to enter the 
home or direct defendant to "come out,"as argued by defendant, defendant's seizure was 
permissible because he committed a new intervening crime, assault. See Griego, 933 P.2d 
at 1008 (refusing to extent the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to a new intervening crime 
committed by a defendant in response to a prior illegality); Wagstaff, 846 P.2d at 1312-13 
(same in context of tampering). Accord United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1017-18 
(11th Cir. 1982) (considering essentially identical facts and concluding that "the police may 
legally arrest a defendant for a new, distinct crime, even if the new crime is in response to 
police misconduct and causally connected thereto"), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983). See 
also 3 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel Criminal Procedure § 9.4(f), at 381 (2d Ed. 
1999) (recognizing that when a suspect responds to a police illegality by assaulting an 
officer, he may be arrested for the new crime); State v. Aydelotte. 665 P.2d 443,447 (Wash. 
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App. 1983) (recognizing that "all courts which have considered this issue . . . agree that 
evidence of [post-illegal] entry assaults on police officers are outside the scope of the 
exclusionary rule"). 
In sum, even if this Court were to address the substance of the Fourth Amendment 
issue, defendant has not established that his claim is meritorious. Consequently, he has not 
established that his counsel performed deficiently or that the trial court obviously erred in 
failing to address it below. See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 34; Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ff 
22-26; Z)iaz, 2002 UT App 288, If 41-44. 
(C) Even If an Illegality Occurred, Defendant Has Not Established 
Prejudice. 
As previously stated, a shortcut in analyzing ineffective counsel and plain error claims 
is to simply address prejudice. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31 n. 14. If a defendant cannot 
establish that the alleged errors impacted the outcome of the trial, the claims necessarily fail. 
Id. Here, lack of prejudice summarily disposes of defendant's claims. 
Defendant presupposes that once he establishes an illegality, any evidence which 
flows from the illegality is required to be suppressed (Br.Aplt. at 24-26). While this is the 
general rule, its application is not universal. Instead, in Utah, the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine is inapplicable and suppression unwarranted when, in response to a police illegality, 
the defendant responds with force against the officer or commits a new intervening crime.8 
See Trane, 2002 UT 97, \ 33 (refusing to overturn a drug possession conviction which 
8
 The cases cited by defendant (Br.Aplt. at 18-22), are not determinative of this 
issue because none involved the Fourth Amendment issue raised here, i.e., an alleged 
police illegality followed by the defendant's use of force or commitment of a new crime. 
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flowed from Trane's arrest for interfering, because, irrespective of the legality of the original 
police order, Trane physically resisted); Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574-76 (refusing to consider 
the lawfulness of an order which precipitated Gardiner's assault on a police officer who was 
"doing what he . . . was employed to do"); Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008 (holding that "[a]n 
illegal entry or prior illegality by officers does not affect the subsequent arrest of a defendant 
where there is an intervening illegal act by the suspect," i.e., assault by a prisoner). Accord 
Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131,1fl[ 14-16 (reaffirming that the Utah rule prohibiting the use of 
force in response to an alleged police illegality does not undermine the Fourth Amendment, 
but recognizes society's greater interest in the peaceful judicial settlement of differences). 
Here, the officers were doing what officers are suppose to do. See Gardiner, 814 P.2d 
at 574 (establishing that the test for whether an officer is acting within his or her "scope of 
authority" is whether the "officer is doing what he or she was employed to do or is engag[ed] 
in a personal frolic of his or her own") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Having received a complaint that drugs were being used or sold at the condominium, they 
went to the residence with the intention of conducting a "knock and talk." Such an 
investigative approach is standard and proper. See Scott, 782 A.2d at 867-68 (recognizing 
"well-established" rule that "police officers, in the course of their official business, are 
permitted to approach one's dwelling and seek permission to question the occupant"). See 
also Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, f^ 13 (recognizing that whether an officer acts within the 
scope of his authority is not contingent upon the lawfulness of the detention or arrest, but on 
whether the officer's actions had the "indicia of being lawful"). 
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Moreover, even if defendant had the right to ignore the officer and flee the premises, 
that right—to the extent it ever existed—stopped the moment defendant assaulted Agent 
Burnett. Utah law does not permit an arrest for a new crime to be invalidated simply because 
it flowed from a prior police illegality. See Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008. Indeed, as this Court 
recognizes: 
"' [a] contrary rule would virtually immunize a defendant from prosecution for 
all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient causal connection to the 
police misconduct.... Unlike the situation where in response to the unlawful 
police action the defendant merely reveals a crime that already has been or is 
being committed, extending the fruits [of the poisonous tree] doctrine to 
immunize a defendant from arrest for new crimes gives a defendant an 
intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts so long as they are 
sufficiently connected to the chain of causation started by the police 
misconduct. This result is too far reaching and too high a price to pay in order 
to deter police misconduct. 
Id. (quoting Wagstaff, 846 P.2d at 1313 (quoting Bailey, 691 F.2d at 1017)). 
In sum, irrespective of the legality of Agent Barnett's directive to come out of hiding, 
defendant's subsequent illegal use of force against the officers precludes suppression. 
Consequently, resolution of the Fourth Amendment issue would not affect defendant's 
conviction. Without prejudice, defendant's claims necessarily fail. 
POINT If 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S FUGITIVE STATUS TO ESTABLISH HIS MOTIVE 
IN ATTEMPTING TO FLEE AND THEN ATTACKING THE POLICE. 
During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defendant objected to admission of 
evidence of his parole fugitive status (R146: 210). The trial court properly ruled that 
9
 This point responds to defendant's Point IV. 
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defendant's fugitive status was relevant, pursuant to rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, to 
explain his reaction to the police, and that any unfair prejudice from the admission of the 
evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value under rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R146: 211, 214, 216). See Addendum A (rules). The court then correctly 
concluded that the evidence was admissible, pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
to establish defendant's motive in initially fleeing and then forcibly confronting the police 
(R146: 214, 218). See Addendum B (argument and oral ruling). See also State v. Holbert, 
2002UTApp426,f24,61P.3d291;5ra^v.5rarf/^;,2002UTApp348,ff 17-18, 57 P.3d 
1139 (explaining the interplay of rules 402, 403, and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence). 
Defendant correctly cites the applicable standards, but fails to acknowledge that the 
court's ruling is consistent with Utah precedent and the majority view that a defendant's 
fugitive status is relevant and probative of his motive and intent in fleeing and/or forcibly 
confronting police. 
Most individuals peacefully submit to police orders (R146: 121-22, 165). When a 
suspect responds with force, his or her status as a fugitive and its attendant fear of returning 
to prison become relevant to the suspect's motive and intent. See State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 
231,234 (Utah 1987) (affirming the admission of evidence of the defendant's fugitive status 
to establish his motive in shooting at the police to avoid apprehension, where defendant 
claimed that his drug intoxication made him think that the officers were assailants attacking 
him); State v. Neal, 262 P.2d 756, 125 (Utah 1953) (holding that evidence that the defendant 
was on parole and wanted on felony-warrants was "certainly material" and admissible to 
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show his motive in killing a police officer), cert, denied, 347 U.S. 963 (1954). Accord 
United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394-95 (3rd Cir. 2003); Weitz v. State, 794 P.2d 952, 
956 (Alaska App. 1990); State v. Hampton, 855 P.2d 621, 624-26 & n. 16 (Or. 1993) (en 
banc) (all recognizing that a defendant's fugitive and parole status are "highly relevant" and 
admissible pursuant to rule 404(b)-type rules, where defendant used force against an officer). 
Here, it was essentially undisputed that defendant was high on methamphetamine or 
some other drug at the time of the offense. Agent Barnett, a drug recognition officer, 
testified that defendant's continued aggressiveness after being shot was typical of 
methamphetamine users (R146: 76, 86-87). Dr. Robert Rothfeder, the defense expert, 
explained that ingestion of methamphetamine often results in extreme strength and 
aggressive behavior, and if ingested in high amounts, may result in distorted judgment, 
paranoia, and delusions (R147: 49-64). 
Defendant argued that his ingestion of drugs affected his intent in that he mistakenly 
believed the officers were gang members out to get him ; defendant argued this made him 
guilty only of simple assault (R147: 134-37).l0 He also claimed that even if the jury believed 
he knew the men were police officers, he did not intentionally try to disarm Detective Jensen 
and, therefore, was guilty only of assault on a peace officer (id.). 
The prosecutor's position was that while drugs may have added to defendant's 
aggression and allowed him to withstand being kicked and shot, defendant knew the agents 
were police officers and intentionally disarmed the detective (R146: 210-12; R147: 113-17, 
10
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (1999) restricts evidence of voluntary drug usage 
to intentional and knowing crimes. 
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139). To counter the defense theory that defendant's drug usage drove his fear (R146: 211, 
218), the prosecutor, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, moved to admit evidence 
that defendant was a fugitive from parole at the time of the incident (R146: 210). The 
prosecutor argued that defendant's motive in violently confronting the police was to avoid 
capture at any cost (R146: 210-12). The prosecutor agreed that this was probably not 
defendant's only motive since the basement was "full of pornography" and defendant's 
wallet, abandoned in the bathroom, contained drugs (R146: 217). But the prosecutor felt that 
introduction of the latter offenses was more complicated than the evidence of defendant's 
fugitive status and would create a trial within a trial, especially since the drug charge was 
pending trial (R146: 215-17). 
The court agreed (R146:215-16,218). See Addendum B (argument and ruling). The 
court cautioned the prosecutor that only defendant's fugitive status was relevant to his motive 
in fleeing and forcibly confronting the police, not his underlying conviction (R146: 216). 
The court then compared the simplicity of establishing fugitive status with the complexity 
of establishing possession of drugs or pornography and concluded that it was "cleaner" and 
more probative to introduce defendant's fugitive status to explain why defendant "wanted 
to get away and why he would contest... so aggressively]" (R146: 214, 216). The court 
considered the prejudicial impact of the fugitive evidence, but determined that its unfair 
prejudicial impact did not outweigh its probative value (R146: 211, 214, 216, 218). 
Nevertheless, to minimize improper use of the evidence, the court instructed the jury on its 
non-character relevancy (R146: 218-19,224-25). See State v. Valdez,M>2 P.2d53,55 (Utah 
• '• 2 3 
1967) (encouraging trial courts to give a cautionary instruction concerning other crimes 
evidence if requested by counsel). 
The court's ruling complies with the requirements of rules 402, 403, and 404(b) and 
with the appellate courts' directive to scrutinize prior bad acts evidence before admitting it. 
See Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, fflf 30-32; Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, ^ 19. Nevertheless, 
defendant argues that the trial court's ruling did not meet these evidentiary requirements 
because it amounted to no more that a "simple conclusory statement" (Br.Aplt. at 31). The 
record does not support this assertion. See Addendum B (R146: 211, 214, 215-216, 218). 
Defendant's real complaint is with the court's finding that his fugitive status was 
relevant and probative (R146: 211 & 214). As previously discussed, the court's ruling is 
consistent with the majority view. See cases cited, supra. Nevertheless, defendant claims 
the ruling was "premature," because he had not yet presented a defense (Br.Aplt. at 25). The 
argument ignores the record facts and Utah precedent. In this case, counsel did not conceal 
the defense. Prior to trial, defense counsel properly explained the defense in securing the 
appointment of his expert, Dr. Rothfeder (R. 51-52, 69-70). He also explained the defense 
in his opening statement (R146: 50-51). Additionally, when the rule 404(b) motion was 
argued, counsel did not claim that introduction of the bad acts evidence was premature: he 
acknowledged that he would be presenting witnesses to establish that defendant's motive in 
fleeing and then confronting the police was his mistaken belief that the officers were gang 
members, which belief was in part fueled by drug intoxication (R146: 210-11). Moreover, 
even if the court had been unaware of the specifics of defendant's defense, admission of the 
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bad acts evidence in the State's case-in-chief was permissible because defendant's not guilty 
plea put every element of the offense at issue. See Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, f^ f 21 & 23 
(recognizing that when intent and knowledge are elements of the crime, the prosecution may 
introduce bad acts evidence in its case-in-chief to establish a defendant's motive and intent). 
See also Collier, 736 P.2d at 233 (recognizing that a "[defendant's status as a wanted 
fugitive [is] clearly indicative of his motive to avoid capture" and admissible to prove that 
he was "not mistaken as to the identity of the police officers"); Neal, 262 P.2d at 758 
(recognizing that where defendant was a fugitive when he killed a police officer, evidence 
of his status was admissible to show his "state of mind . . . as to his knowledge that he was 
being sought, his fear of apprehension and the consequences thereof were certainly material 
as bearing upon the likelihood and motive he might have" in suing force against the officer). 
In sum, defendant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of his fugitive status to establish motive. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for disarming a peace officer should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &&fa day of November, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM A 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all cnminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; ir-
relevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a partic-
ular occasion, except: 
(a)( 1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted 
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of 
the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, 




(The jury exits the courtroom.) 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Your Honor, the next witness that 
the state would call part of his testimony would be the fact 
that he called in to dispatch and found that there was a 
warrant out for the defendant, that he was on parole with 
Adult Probation and Parole and was a fugitive at that time. 
Obviously the defense is going to object to that evidence 
coming in. The state believes that that falls under .404 B 
under motive as to the reasoning behind his running and his 
actions because he knew that he was on probation and parole 
at the time, and that as a result of that, that would explain 
or give him at least motive and knowledge at that time. 
Because if this were a drug dealer or somebody else that was 
coming to get him, there would be no reason for him to run 
like that. 
The fact that he was on parole at the time would suggest 
or at least give him motive and knowledge and that falls 
under the exception under 404 B to allow that evidence in. 
And is not more prejudicial than probative. It does go to 
the state's case and would show the reasoning behind it and 
the reason that he was acting the way that he did. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: We obviously object to that, your 
Honor. Our contention is that that is more prejudicial than 
probative to have the jury know that he was -- to have the 
jury know that he was on parole. Certainly the state is free 
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to make whatever argument they want to at the end of the 
case. Obviously we're going to argue something differently. 
The state's contention at this point is that his motive 
for running couldn't have been provided by any other persons 
of the drug culture coming to the home. We actually intend 
to produce evidence that that, in fact, was a possible 
motive. But we would submit to the Court that the evidence 
that he was on parole is irrelevant, it's highly prejudicial 
and is does not — however the rule states it — that it's 
more prejudicial than probative. 
THE COURT: Of course the rule, it's not just 
whether it's one or the other. Rule 403 says, "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues." 
And so the question is not just which way does it tip, 
but all evidence is presumed to be relevant. And it's only 
excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. Tell me again why you 
feel, Mr. Westmoreland, why it's important that they 
understand that he was on parole. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Your Honor, if they understand he 
was on parole and knowing what parole is — they don't need 
to know the reason he was on parole, what he had done prison 
time for prior to that. Simply the fact that he was on 
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parole and that he was a fugitive at the time, that would be 
the testimony, that he was a fugitive, and knowing that these 
are police officers, at least our evidence is they identified 
themselves as police officers, knowing that he's fugitive and 
that he very likely could be taken into custody again because 
he is a fugitive, that goes directly to what we're trying to 
prove to give other reasons for why he was running. 
We understand what the defense's point is going to be and 
this is extremely relevant. It does not — is not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature. This is 
not prejudicial that it shows other crimes or something. It 
simply shows that he was a fugitive and that he was afraid of 
the police officers because he did not want to be taken into 
custody again. Then it goes through and explains exactly — 
or it shows at least it gives us an argument and gives them a 
rational reason to see what his — why his behavior was the 
way it was. 
THE COURT: See — go ahead and respond, then I'll 
ask you a question. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, I suppose basically this comes 
down to a dispute in the evidence. Even the state's own 
witnesses some of them indicate that they were not clear as 
to whether other officers identified themselves to the 
defendant. 
I think what's really relevant at this point is that at 
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the point the defendant began to run, did he know. And we 
anticipate producing evidence from Danny Winder who was — 
the testimony shows was with Officer Barnett at the time that 
the defendant was located in the bathroom and ran. I 
anticipate that Mr. Winder will testify that the officer did 
not identify himself as an officer at that point. So it 
comes down to a he said/he said kind of thing. And under 
those circumstances, what the jury is going to have to is 
weigh the credibility of the officer's testimony against the 
credibility of the other witnesses1 testimony, we end up 
clouding the issue with something that clearly is 
prejudicial. The question is how much how much prejudice 
does it carry to something that is clearly prejudicial and 
saying oh, by the way, this guy was on parole and he was a 
fugitive. 
It's difficult enough -- for the defendant in any 
criminal case has a tough enough time by sitting here at the 
defense table being in charged with a crime. And it's 
difficult enough to try to convince a jury that they need to 
believe these citizen witnesses over police officer 
witnesses, because we all know no matter we say under the law 
and the Constitution, we all know that people generally 
believe police officers over citizens. So that battle alone 
is quite enough for the defendant without binding him with 
this clearly prejudicial evidence that he was on parole at 
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the time. I mean, the evidence I think is going to be clear 
from all witnesses who were there that the defendant ran and 
that there was a struggle with police. 
THE COURT: Okay. But the jury then has to hear 
well, why would he run, why would he struggle. I mean, most 
of us would just submit. What was it that motivated him to 
want to contend with a police officer and get away? 
Ifm going to deny — or grant your motion and deny your 
objection, Mr. Bouwhuis, because I think that it does go to 
show motive to run and why he wanted to get away and why he 
would contest. Because most people would not — thatfs not 
the normal behavior of most of us. Most of us would submit 
if we had nothing to hide and it explains why he was so 
aggressive with the officer, and so I think that it is 
probative in that way. I acknowledge the prejudice that it 
shows, but that probative value is not substantially 
outweighed by the prejudice. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: For the record, can I just interject 
something, your Honor? This is not — as far as I can recall 
this has not come out yet in any of the witnesses the state 
has presented. But there is one witness I'm aware of who the 
state has who does have this information in his possession, 
and that is after this incident was all over with and the 
scene was secured, the police went into search the home, in 
the area where Corey Maisey was they found a wallet with his 
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identification and drugs. And in fact, we put this on the 
record earlier, the state intends to file the charge based on 
the possession of drugs there and that — the record would 
reflect that that is not a stretch to say that he wanted to 
get away because he knew that there were drugs in the 
bathroom and that they could be tied to him and that could 
provide another motivation for him to run. And I donft think 
the state — as far as the factual representation I think the 
state would agree. 
THE COURT: But is there evidence that the state has 
right now that there's been a testing of those drugs and they 
know what it is, can they really show that it was his as 
opposed to somebody else's in the home? 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Well, we don't have any — just 
for the record, we don't have any intent of putting that 
evidence on. That's another case for another day. All we're 
worried about to — I mean, if the defense wants to bring 
that up, that's great. You know, we'll bring in rebuttal 
witnesses to take care of that issue. But we don't intend on 
putting that issue on at all. 
THE COURT: The concern that I have with that, 
Mr. Bouwhuis, and I appreciate your advocacy, but I think 
that we do then is we create another case within this case. 
We create a drug case within this case, which I think also 
has great prejudice toward the defendant. We then have to 
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put on a chain of evidence to show that he had knowledge the 
drugs were his, you know, the testing of the drugs and I 
think that takes up a lot time. And I think that just the 
fact that he maybe was on parole is clean and I think it 
explains motive and that's what the state wants. And Ifm 
finding that the probative value of that evidence is not 
substantially outweighed — or excuse me, that the unfair 
prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative 
value. I think it is probative. I think it explains motive, 
I will limit the state, however, in that they are not to 
testify as to what the charge was or the conviction unless 
the defendant feels that at that point based on my ruling 
that it would be probably in his advantage to have that on 
because it might — rather than have him — rather than have 
the jury speculate about something very serious, it might be 
more minimal. I don't know what he's on parole for. I'll 
leave that up to your judgment. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Let me just real briefly just so the 
record reflects this. On the issue that the Court 
mentioned — and I accept the Court's ruling on the issue. 
But the Court stated that we would create a case within a 
case trying to show a connection with the drugs and the 
testing and all of that, but I think the real issue goes to 
his motive of running and that wouldn't have to do with 
whether the stuff was tested but whether or not he believed 
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at that time he was getting caught with drugs, not whether 
they actually ended up being tested as drugs. What it all 
goes to is what his state of mind was at the time and I just 
wanted the record to reflect that. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Let me think about that for just 
a moment. Do you want to respond? 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Well, your Honor, if that's -- I 
mean, if defense counsel wants us to put on a case that we 
believe there were drugs down there and that he was the owner 
of those drugs and is not going to make us put on a chain of 
evidence to suggestion that, yes, it actually was 
methamphetamine, that's fine. I mean, I think all that does 
is bolster our case more than anything. 
If he wants to put on an alternative theory saying that 
there were drugs down there, et cetera, he was running 
because of drugs, that's fine. But I don't see how that has 
anything to do with his parole status and the reason he runs. 
He could put on as many alternative theories for running as 
we wants. But again, I don't think that precludes us from 
putting on the issue that we want to deal with in the fact 
that he was on parole. We could put that evidence on, that's 
fine. But again, I'm not sure that that necessarily helps 
the defense's case. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: If I may, your Honor, I don't know if 
we're both just advocating our causes here. But it almost 
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sounds like the defendant is being put in a catch-22; choose 
the lesser of two evils, you can either tell the jury that 
you were on parole or you can tell the jury that you were 
using drugs. All we're saying is we don't want the jury to 
be told that he was on parole. We're not saying, Judge, we 
want to give you a choice; the drugs or parole. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: But the drugs have nothing to do 
with his parole status. The jury never has to hear nor are 
they prejudiced if they don't hear the fact that there are 
drugs down there. I mean, if that's the case, there's 
pornography down there which is illegal, there's a whole lot 
of other things down there that are illegal, but that does 
not vitiate the fact that he was on parole and that that goes 
to motive for his running. 
THE DEFENDANT: Running because of fear. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Of course running is not the crime, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to grant — or not — I'm 
going to allow it to come in. Let me say this: If you want, 
Mr. Bouwhuis, I will give a cautionary instruction. I 
will — I'm willing to give an instruction that their focus 
is not to be on the issue that he is on parole, that it is to 
be considered only as an explanation of why he might be 
running and it's not to be considered for any other purpose, 
and particularly, they are not to consider it as proving in 
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any way his character in this case. And if you would like an 
instruction to that extent, sort of a cautionary instruction, 
Ifm willing to do that. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Judge, we would request that 
instruction, in fact. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Yeah. I agree with that. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Can we have a few minutes recess 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. I need a few minutes as well. 
(A recess was taken.) 
(The jury enters the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Westmoreland. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: The state calls Officer Pat Vega. 
EAT VEGA, 
having been duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: ......... 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WES1M2KELAND: 
Q. Please tell us your name and spell your last name. 
A. Patrick Vega, V-E-G-A. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
A. Police officer with South Ogden police. 
Q. How long have you been with South Ogden? 
A. Four years. 
